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I.	Introduction:	Despite	an	ongoing	accommodative	monetary	policy	by	the	Bank	of	Japan	(BOJ)	in	response	to	Japan’s	asset	price	bubble	burst	in	the	early	1990’s,	the	Yen	has	experienced	numerous	periods	of	strong	appreciation.	In	2016	alone,	the	Yen	sharply	appreciated	in	early	January,	after	the	Brexit	vote,	and	after	Donald	Trump’s	nomination	for	presidency.	This	contradicts	commonly	accepted	economic	theories	regarding	monetary	policy,	interest	rates,	and	money	supply,	which	makes	a	clear	understanding	of	the	Yen’s	movement	necessary	to	evaluate	the	potential	benefits	and	risks	associated	with	portfolio	rebalancements	towards	Yen-denominated	investments.	Thus,	this	paper’s	main	research	question	is:	What	factors	explain	the	Japanese	Yen’s	abnormal,	appreciative	behavior,	how	do	these	impact	the	Yen,	and	what	are	implications	for	Yen-denominated	investments?	The	answer	to	this	question	is	especially	relevant	for	investors	because	conventional	economic	theories	may	not	apply	to	the	Yen	and	investors	not	understanding	this	notion	may	misinterpret	Japanese	market	data.	Consequently,	this	paper’s	results	will	act	as	a	guideline	for	money	managers	interested	in	investing	in	Japan.	The	most	relevant	literature	regarding	this	topic	comes	from	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	who	identified	the	Japanese	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	as	the	main	explanation	for	its	unexpected	movements.	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	further	found	that	a	country’s	net	foreign	asset	position,	its	market	liquidity,	and	its	debt-to-GDP	ratio	determine	its	safe	haven	status.	Additional	research	by	Yoshino	and	Vollmer	(2014)	and	Horioka	et	al	(2013)	showed	that	Japan’s	debt,	despite	its	magnitude,	is	mostly	absorbed	domestically,	which	makes	it	much	more	stable,	minimizes	its	negative	economic	consequences,	and	so	justifies	the	Yen’s	haven	status.	
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The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	identify	the	factors	influencing	the	Japanese	exchange	rate	and	to	understand	what	money	managers	have	to	consider	when	investing	in	Japan.	While	much	of	the	analysis	resembles	literature,	the	main	contribution	of	this	work	is	the	inclusion	of	yesterday’s	Yen	exchange	rate	as	an	independent	variable	to	evaluate	whether	the	efficient	market	hypothesis	or	the	momentum	effect	dominates	in	the	case	of	the	Yen.	Furthermore,	this	paper	connects	regression	results	with	investment	advice	regarding	Yen-denominated	investments,	which	has	not	been	done	yet.		The	results	highlight	Japan’s	safe	haven	status	and	that	rising	risk-aversion	appreciates	the	Yen.	Investors	can	therefore	buy	Yen-denominated	assets	to	decrease	portfolio	variance.	Additionally,	news	announcements	are	not	immediately,	but	gradually	factored	into	the	Yen’s	value.	Thus,	the	momentum	effect	exists	and	investors	could	profit	from	predictable	price	drifts.	Lastly,	the	results	indicate	that	many	economic	occurrences	in	Japan	contradict	economic	theories.	Consequently,	investors	should	treat	Japanese	economic	data	with	caution.	The	structure	of	this	paper	is	as	follows.	Section	2	discusses	economic	theories	regarding	exchange	rates,	section	3	reviews	the	literature,	section	4	and	5	discuss	the	econometric	model	and	its	implications,	and	section	6	summarizes	the	main	results,	suggestions	for	investors,	this	paper’s	limitations,	and	future	research	possibilities.				
II.	Analytical	Framework:	The	main	focus	of	this	paper	is	to	analyze	exchange	rates.	While	exchange	rates	are	impacted	by	many	different	macroeconomic	variables,	monetary	policy	has	a	major	effect	on	the	money	supply	and	thus	currencies.	The	main	purpose	of	monetary	policy	is	to	buy	debt	from	the	non-banking	private	sector	(NBPS),	monetize	it,	and	increase	the	
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money	supply	in	the	economy.	This	causes	a	decline	in	purchasing	power	and	depreciates	the	domestic	currency.	Accommodative	monetary	policy	further	puts	depreciative	pressure	on	the	domestic	currency	through	lower	interest	rates	that	flatten	the	yield	curve.	This	implies	lower	potential	returns	on	investments,	which	deters	foreign	investments	and	leads	to	a	net	capital	outflow	as	investors	search	for	higher	yields	abroad.	The	result	is	a	further	depreciation	of	the	domestic	currency.		Another	factor	linked	to	monetary	policy	is	economic	growth.	As	a	nation’s	economic	growth	accelerates,	its	central	bank	increases	its	target	rate	to	decelerate	the	money	supply	growth	and	increase	the	cost	of	borrowing.	This	decreases	investments	and	consumption,	resulting	in	slower	economic	growth	and	preventing	overheating	as	highlighted	in	the	output	equation,	Y=C+I+G+NX.	The	central	bank’s	action	then	initiates	a	capital	inflow	and	a	currency	appreciation,	as	the	higher	returns	on	domestic	assets	attract	more	investors.		The	balance	of	payment	theory	connects	a	country’s	current	account	to	its	exchange	rate.	If	a	country	is	running	a	current	account	deficit,	it	will	need	more	foreign	exchange	than	it	reaps	from	sales	of	its	exported	goods	to	finance	imports.	Thus,	it	supplies	more	of	its	domestic	currency	to	the	global	economy	than	what	its	trading	partners	demand.	This	oversupply	eventually	leads	to	a	depreciation	of	the	domestic	currency	and	a	rebalancement	of	the	current	account.		One	last	major	determinant	of	exchange	rates	is	the	domestic	inflation	rate.	High	inflation	deteriorates	the	purchasing	power	of	the	domestic	currency,	as	more	units	of	currency	are	needed	to	purchase	the	same	good.	Thus,	the	domestic	currency	becomes	relatively	less	valuable	and	depreciates.		 In	the	early	1990’s,	the	Japanese	economy	was	experiencing	an	asset	price	bubble,	which	burst	in	1992	and	introduced	Japan	to	a	decade	long	recession	from	
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which	it	still	has	not	fully	recovered.	The	immediate	response	by	the	BOJ	was	an	expansionary	monetary	policy	program	to	decrease	interest	rates,	encourage	lending	in	the	economy,	and	spur	economic	growth.	The	initial	policy	rate	of	8.6%	in	1991	was	first	decreased	to	0.5%	in	1995	and	subsequently	to	0%	in	1999.	However,	inflation	turned	negative	in	1998	and	has	remained	low	ever	since,	while	economic	growth	has	stayed	highly	volatile	and	sluggish,	as	illustrated	in	Graph	1.	After	a	temporary	rate	increase	in	2000,	the	BOJ	expanded	its	monetary	policy	efforts	by	implementing	quantitative	easing,	QE	(Kurihara,	2012).	Except	for	a	period	between	2006-2008,	the	BOJ	upheld	this	program	until	2013,	after	which	it	replaced	QE	by	a	more	comprehensive	program	called	quantitative	and	qualitative	easing	(QQE).	The	main	goal	of	this	new	policy	was	to	both	lower	yields	on	medium	and	long-term	government	bonds	to	increase	investments,	consumption,	and	thus	the	money	supply,	as	well	as	change	people’s	inflation	expectation	through	forward	guidance.		A	logical	assumption,	as	previously	explained,	is	that	the	BOJ’s	ongoing	accommodative	monetary	policy	measures	depreciate	the	Yen.	However,	a	closer	look	at	the	past	Yen	exchange	rate	raises	doubts	regarding	this	conclusion.	Graph	2	shows	the	Dollar-Yen	exchange	rate	since	the	1970’s.	It	illustrates	that	the	Yen	steadily	appreciated	between	1992	and	1995,	despite	the	BOJ’s	accommodative	monetary	policy.	In	addition,	while	the	BOJ	implemented	QE	in	the	early	2000s,	the	Yen	appreciated	between	2002	and	2004,	which	again	contradicts	conventional	economic	theories.	Graph	3	shows	the	most	recent	trends	in	the	Japanese	exchange	rate.	The	Yen	has	steadily	appreciated	after	the	global	financial	crisis	despite	the	continuation	of	the	BOJ’s	QE	program.	While	it	began	to	depreciate	after	the	introduction	of	QQE	in	2013,	consistent	with	economic	theories,	the	Yen	started	to	appreciate	again	in	2016	despite	
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ongoing	QQE,	falling	from	120	Yen	per	Dollar	in	early	2016	to	roughly	100	Yen	per	Dollar	in	November	2016.	A	potential	explanation	for	the	apparent	ineffectiveness	of	the	BOJ	is	that	conventional	economic	theories	suggest	that	an	accommodative	monetary	policy	increases	a	country’s	money	supply	and	depreciates	the	local	currency.	This	statement	is	not	entirely	true.	To	increase	a	country’s	money	supply,	banks	must	monetize	debt	by	lending	funds	to	the	NBPS.	A	flatter	yield	curve	and	thus	lower	interest	rates	result	in	higher	demand	for	loans	from	the	NBPS,	but	do	not	necessarily	mean	that	these	demands	will	be	automatically	satisfied.	First,	despite	higher	demand	and	profit	opportunities,	banks	might	be	reluctant	to	lend	to	corporations	if	the	probability	of	repayment	is	very	low.	Thus,	regardless	of	the	potential	returns,	banks	refuse	to	provide	firms	and	consumers	with	funds,	leading	to	a	credit	crunch	and	preventing	a	money	supply	increase.	Contrarily,	firms	and	consumers	might	not	be	willing	to	borrow	money,	even	at	very	attractive	rates,	if	the	economic	outlook	is	highly	uncertain.	If	firms	expect	future	demand	to	fall,	then	investing	in	new	capacity	is	counterproductive,	as	these	assets	will	probably	never	be	used.	Therefore,	one	explanation	for	the	absence	of	a	depreciative	pressure	on	the	Yen	despite	accommodative	monetary	policy	could	be	that	the	channels	necessary	for	a	money	supply	increase	are	simply	not	functioning.		Graphs	4	and	5	illustrate	the	difference	in	money	supply	increase	between	the	U.S.	and	Japan.	While	the	U.S.	money	supply	increase	fluctuates	between	roughly	4-8%	and	seems	to	react	to	monetary	policy,	the	Japanese	money	supply	increase	has	remained	between	2-4%	ever	since	the	market	crash	in	1992,	despite	ongoing	monetary	policy.	This	comparison	emphasizes	that	the	BOJ’s	monetary	policy	efforts	have	been	much	less	effective	in	raising	the	domestic	money	supply	relative	to	its	U.S.	counterpart.	Thus,	the	common	misconception	of	monetary	policy	directly	increasing	
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the	money	supply	might	have	led	to	a	Yen	behavior	that	many	observers	interpret	as	abnormal.	
	
III.	Literature	Review:		Kim	and	Kang	(2013)	analyzed	the	Yen’s	behavior	since	1980	and	found	that	relative	monetary	easing	by	the	BOJ	depreciated	the	Yen,	while	relative	monetary	tightening	appreciated	it.	Thus,	the	authors	found	a	clear	linear	relationship	between	the	BOJ’s	policy	rate	and	the	Yen.		Ueda	(2012)	studied	the	same	relationship	and	obtained	results	that	contradict	Kim	and	Kang’s	(2013)	conclusion.	Looking	at	empirical	data,	Ueda	(2012)	found	that	the	Yen-Dollar	exchange	rate	moves	in	the	opposite	direction	of	what	economic	theories	suggest,	since	the	Yen	strengthened	during	periods	of	expansionary	monetary	policy.	The	author	ran	an	econometric	analysis,	which	further	showed	that	few	policy	measures	had	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	the	Yen-Dollar	exchange	rate.	He	concluded	that	Japanese	monetary	policy	fails	to	explain	movements	in	the	Yen-Dollar	exchange	rate	(Ueda,	2012).	Compared	to	Kim	and	Kang	(2013),	Ueda’s	(2012)	findings	seem	more	plausible	after	accounting	for	the	conclusions	drawn	from	Graphs	2	and	3.	Therefore,	since	the	BOJ’s	monetary	policy	moves	seem	insignificant	in	explaining	the	variability	of	the	Yen,	what	factors	do	affect	its	value?		Coudert	et	al	(2014)	discussed	another	attribute	that	might	explain	the	Yen’s	abnormal	behavior,	namely	safe	haven	currencies.	Such	assets	enable	investors	to	hedge	their	portfolio	against	risk	arising	from	crisis	periods,	since	safe	haven	currencies	are	negatively	correlated	with	other	risky	assets	and,	similar	to	gold,	appreciate	during	periods	of	rising	global	uncertainty.	
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In	their	paper,	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	tried	to	identify	safe	haven	currencies	by	establishing	two	conditions.	First,	such	assets	have	a	negative	risk	premium,	implying	negative	expected	excess	returns	over	the	long	run.	Second,	safe	haven	currencies	have	positive	excess	returns	during	crisis	periods,	resulting	in	an	appreciation	beyond	values	expected	by	investors.		The	data	used	incorporated	26	currencies	from	advanced	and	emerging	economies,	which	were	divided	into	three	subcategories	according	to	trading	volumes.	For	all	currencies,	daily	data	was	gathered	encompassing	a	time	period	starting	in	01/01/1990	for	the	five	main	currencies,	01/01/1999	for	all	other	currencies,	and	ranging	until	04/23/2013.	All	exchange	rates	were	calculated	against	the	Special	Drawing	Right	(SDR),	an	artificial	currency	used	by	the	IMF.	Empirical	results	indicated	that	only	two	currencies,	the	Dollar	and	the	Yen,	met	the	authors’	1st	condition	-	negative	mean	excess	returns	over	the	sample	period.	During	the	sample	period,	the	Yen	suffered	a	mean	excess	return	of	-0.7%.	Next,	to	check	for	currencies	meeting	the	2nd	condition,	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	defined	crisis	periods	using	the	volatility	index	of	the	S&P	500,	the	VIX.	This	proxy	represents	global	imbalances	well	despite	being	linked	to	a	U.S.	stock	index,	as	most	firms	listed	on	the	S&P500	maintain	a	global	presence.	A	VIX	above	30	was	defined	as	a	crisis	and	a	VIX	above	40	as	a	severe	crisis.	The	authors	identified	10	crisis	periods	between	1990	and	2013	and	found	that	only	the	Dollar	and	the	Yen	met	their	2nd	condition,	since	both	appreciated	during	volatile	periods.	The	Yen	appreciated	by	10.3%	during	crisis	and	by	25.3%	during	severe	crisis.		Coudert	et	al’s	(2014)	econometric	model	further	provided	statistically	significant	evidence	that	both	the	Dollar	and	Yen	appreciate	when	the	VIX	increases.	Outside	crisis	periods,	a	1%	increase	in	the	VIX	leads	to	a	1.4%	increase	in	the	Yen,	
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while	during	crisis	periods,	a	1%	increase	in	the	VIX	leads	to	a	1%	increase	in	the	Yen.	Thus,	Coudert	et	al’s	(2014)	analysis	illustrates	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	which	could	explain	its	irregular	exchange	rate	patterns	and	its	apparent	immunity	to	monetary	policy.	The	authors	added	value	to	the	literature	by	accounting	for	currencies	originating	from	different	countries	with	different	levels	of	development,	enabling	a	global	coverage	of	potential	safe	haven	currencies.	Nonetheless,	one	weakness	of	this	paper	was	the	use	of	only	one	crisis	proxy,	the	VIX.	Despite	its	global	reach,	other	papers	included	a	broader	range	of	variables	that	may	have	depicted	global	uncertainty	more	accurately.		Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	examined	32	assets	commonly	believed	to	be	safe	haven	assets,	which	ranged	from	government	bonds,	currencies,	and	commodities	to	alternative	investments	such	as	wine,	and	analyzed	whether	these	assets	actually	possess	safe	haven	properties.	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	incorporated	a	wider	range	of	assets	relative	to	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	which	might	provide	new	insight	regarding	the	Yen	that	the	previous	paper	did	not	offer.		First,	the	two	authors	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	hedge	and	safe	haven	assets.	Hedge	assets	are	negatively	correlated	with	other	assets	over	the	long	run	and,	during	market	downturns,	may	fall	in	value	along	with	other	risky	assets.	Contrarily,	safe	haven	assets	are	solely	negatively	correlated	with	other	assets	during	crisis	periods.	Thus,	their	hedge	characteristics	only	materialize	during	periods	of	heightened	uncertainty.	This	distinction	between	hedge	and	safe	haven	assets	is	very	important,	as	both	terms	are	very	similar	and	can,	if	not	properly	understood,	lead	to	false	conclusions.		
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To	account	for	crisis	in	their	regression	analysis,	the	authors	used	a	broader	approach	compared	to	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	by	including	two	proxies,	the	VIX	and	returns	on	the	S&P500.	The	threshold	for	the	VIX,	which	depicts	periods	of	unusually	high	uncertainty,	was	at	90%	and	95%,	which	resulted	in	a	VIX	of	29	and	33,	respectively.	A	drawback	was	the	inclusion	of	both	the	S&P500	returns	and	the	VIX,	as	both	are	based	on	the	S&P500	index	and	may	result	in	double	counting.	In	addition,	data	for	different	variables	were	collected	over	different	time	periods,	with	some	dating	back	to	1963,	while	others	only	dated	back	to	2001.	These	misalignments	may	have	caused	inaccurate	results.	In	their	first	test,	the	authors	analyzed	the	response	of	their	32	test	assets	to	rapid	declines	in	S&P500	returns	and	found	that	empirically,	the	Yen	had	been	a	safe	haven	asset	for	U.S.	investors.	This	finding	is	statistically	significant	at	the	10%	level.	In	a	follow-up	tests,	the	authors	replaced	the	S&P500	return	variable	by	the	VIX.	Contrary	to	their	first	findings,	the	authors	found	that	the	Japanese	Yen,	JPY,	is	rather	a	hedge	than	a	safe	haven	asset,	implied	by	its	statistically	insignificant	coefficient	for	the	crisis	variable.	However,	after	increasing	the	data’s	accuracy	by	using	daily	instead	of	monthly	returns,	the	authors	found	that	the	JPY	is	positively	correlated	with	the	VIX	and	can	be	considered	a	safe	haven	currency.	In	their	final	test,	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	divided	the	dataset	into	a	pre-and	post	Lehman	collapse	period	to	assess	whether	the	recent	financial	crisis	influenced	an	asset’s	safe	haven	characteristics.	This	had	not	been	done	by	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	and	could	provide	valuable	insight	into	the	safe	haven	assets	discussion.	The	results	revealed	that	many	assets,	which	had	safe	haven	properties	before	the	financial	crisis,	lost	these	characteristics	in	the	aftermath	and	were	subsequently	positively	correlated	with	market	returns.	Only	U.S.	treasuries,	Japanese	government	bonds,	and	the	JPY	
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continued	to	maintain	their	safe	haven	characteristics,	since	these	assets’	positive	correlation	with	the	market	index	were	statistically	insignificant.	Overall,	both	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	and	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	found	that	the	JPY	is	a	safe	haven	asset	that	is	negatively	correlated	with	market	returns	and	positively	correlated	with	the	VIX,	which	could	explain	the	Yen’s	abnormal	behavior.	However,	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	added	value	to	the	discussion	by	highlighting	the	implications	of	different	data	frequencies,	namely	monthly,	weekly,	and	daily,	on	results.	To	get	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	safe	haven	currencies,	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	utilized	high-frequency	data	for	five	exchanges	rates	between	1993	and	2008	to	find	safe	haven	currencies.	The	authors	used	a	factor	model	to	capture	linear	and	non-linear	patterns	among	the	variables	in	the	data	set,	which	encompassed	bonds,	stocks,	currencies,	market	volatility,	and	liquidity.	The	currency-pairs	included	in	this	study	were	the	USDCHF,	USDDEM,	USDEUR,	USDJPY,	and	USDGBP.	Exchange	rate	data	was	collected	in	5	minutes	intervals,	resulting	in	288	daily	data	points	for	each	currency.	Compared	to	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	and	Kopyl	and	Lee’s	(2016)	wider	approach,	focusing	on	only	a	few	exchange	rates	enabled	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	currencies	involved.		To	account	for	global	stock	and	bond	market	developments,	the	authors	used	futures	contracts	data	of	three	major	indexes,	namely	the	Japanese	Nikkei	futures,	Dax	futures,	and	S&P500	futures.	Futures	trade	during	non-trading	hours,	enabling	a	wider	time	coverage	and	a	more	accurate	reflection	of	security	prices,	which	previous	papers	had	not	considered.	The	proxies	for	market	risk	used	were	the	VIX,	the	FX	volatility	measure,	which	is	the	log	of	realized	volatility	of	exchange	rates	against	the	USD,	and	the	TED	spread,	a	measure	of	funding	liquidity	based	on	the	difference	between	the	3-month	USD	LIBOR	rate	and	the	3-month	T-Bill	rate.	Although	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	
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(2010)	took	a	more	comprehensive	approach	at	measuring	market	risk	compared	to	previous	authors,	the	inclusion	of	both	the	S&P500	futures	and	VIX	may	have	caused	the	double	counting	problem	encountered	by	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016).		The	results	aligned	with	studies	by	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	and	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	and	showed	that	the	JPY	portrays	the	strongest,	statistically	significant	safe	haven	characteristics.	It	tends	to	appreciate	when	the	S&P500	declines,	the	foreign	exchange	market	volatility	increases,	and	US	bond	prices	rise.	The	Yen’s	positive	correlation	with	bond	prices	is	plausible,	because	demand	for	bonds	rises	during	times	of	uncertainty	when	investors	avoid	the	volatile	equity	markets	and	invest	in	more	conservative,	less	risky	securities.	In	an	additional	step,	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	used	weekly	instead	of	daily	exchange	rate	data.	The	results	remained	similar,	but	were	less	significant,	which	further	highlights	the	implication	of	using	different	data	frequencies.		To	study	whether	the	results	were	influenced	by	all	currencies	being	paired	with	the	USD,	the	authors	set	all	currencies	against	other,	non-dollar	currencies.		For	instance,	they	substituted	the	USDJPY	pair	by	the	EURJPY	exchange	rate.	Although	the	results	continued	to	underline	the	JPY’s	safe	haven	status,	this	additional	step	could	have	been	avoided	if	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	had	followed	Coudert	et	al’s	(2014)	approach	of	using	the	SDR	as	a	reference	currency.	Finally,	the	authors	examined	the	significance	of	their	crisis	variables	and	found	the	TED	spread	to	be	insignificant	across	all	currencies,	the	VIX	to	be	significant	for	the	JPY	only,	and	the	FX	volatility	index	to	be	a	good,	significant	proxy	for	higher	uncertainty.		While	the	low	𝑅"of	5%	for	the	USDJPY	relationship	implies	that	the	majority	of	the	Yen	exchange	rate	fluctuation	results	from	variables	not	included	in	this	study,	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	more	detailed	approach	offered	insight	regarding	
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bond	prices,	foreign	exchange	volatility,	and	data	frequency	that	had	not	been	provided	by	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	and	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016).	In	addition,	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	insight	regarding	the	significance	of	different	crisis	variables	was	a	value-addition	that	all	previous	authors	failed	to	provide,	as	they	assumed	their	crisis	variables	to	be	significant	to	begin	with.	This	contribution	provides	important	implications	for	future	research.			The	results	of	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016),	and	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	highlighted	one	explanation	for	the	Yen’s	abnormal	behavior,	namely	its	safe	haven	status.	This	aligns	with	my	observation	regarding	Graph	2	and	3,	since	all	periods	of	sharp	appreciation	occurred	during	global	crisis	periods.	The	first	period	in	the	early-to	mid	1990s	can	be	attributed	to	the	Japanese	asset	price	bubble	burst,	the	second	period	to	the	Asian	currency	crisis,	the	third	anomaly	to	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	and	the	last,	most	recent	appreciation	to	stock	market	turbulences	in	China.	As	implied	by	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	ambiguity	leads	to	an	increased	demand	for	safe	haven	assets	and	thus	a	capital	inflow	into	Yen-denominated	assets,	which	appreciates	the	JPY.	Hence,	it	will	be	worthwhile	to	analyze	later	on	how	significant	the	relationship	between	the	JPY	and	global	volatility	is.		In	contrast	to	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016),	and	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010),	Jäggi	et	al	(2016)	took	the	JPY	and	Swiss	Franc’s	(CHF)	safe	haven	status	as	given	and	used	this	assumption	to	find	variables	impacting	their	exchange	rates.	The	paper	researched	three	potential	explanatory	variables	affecting	the	JPY	and	CHF,	which	were	macroeconomic	surprises,	defined	as	the	difference	between	actual	and	expected	market	values;	the	general	market	environment,	influenced	by	corporate	news,	economic	policy	news,	and	political	news;	and	monetary	policy.	To	account	for	the	less	tangible	general	market	environment,	the	authors	used	the	so-called	
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Bloomberg-based	variable.	This	algorithm	created	by	Bloomberg	separates	news	into	positive	and	negative	events	and	will	have	a	negative	sign	if	bad	news	outweighs	positive	news,	vice	versa.	To	augment	this	proxy,	the	VIX	was	used	as	an	additional	measure	of	the	market	environment.	Lastly,	data	from	the	BOJ	and	Swiss	National	Bank	was	used	to	derive	the	current	state	of	monetary	policy.		Compared	to	previous	literature,	Jaeggi	et	al	(2016)	had	a	more	thorough	analysis	of	the	general	macro	environment	by	accounting	for	a	broader	range	of	economic	variables.	These	included,	among	others,	machinery	orders,	retail	sales,	average	hourly	wages,	and	worker	productivity.	In	addition,	nominal	exchange	rates	were	collected	in	five-minute	intervals,	resulting	in	1.472	million	observations	and	being	much	more	comprehensive	compared	to	Coudert	et	al	(2014)	and	Kopyl	and	Lee’s	(2016)	dataset.	Overall,	the	dataset	encompassed	the	period	between	01/2000	and	12/2013.	Unlike	the	SDR	used	in	Coudert	et	al’s	(2014)	model,	the	authors	paired	the	JPY	and	the	CHF	against	the	Euro	and	US	Dollar	and	regressed	them	against	all	non-domestic	macroeconomic	surprise	variables	identified	in	the	sample	period.	The	results	emphasize	that	macroeconomic	surprises	from	France,	Italy,	UK,	Belgium,	and	Spain	had	no	influence	on	the	Yen	or	Swiss	Franc,	while	surprises	stemming	from	the	U.S.,	Germany,	the	respective	domestic	economy,	and	the	Euro	area	significantly	affect	the	Yen.	Most	of	them	originate	from	the	U.S	and	Japan,	which	indicates	that	the	JPY	is	strongly	affected	by	US	and	Japanese	economic	surprises.	The	authors	also	found	that	while	foreign	macroeconomic	surprises	impacted	the	Yen’s	value	once	these	were	made	public,	domestic	surprises	already	influenced	the	Yen	exchange	rate	in	the	pre-announcement	period.	The	𝑅"	in	this	model	was	at	35%,	much	larger	that	in	comparable	literature,	and	the	results	were	significant.	This	shows	that	macroeconomic	
	 15	
surprises	are	a	significant	factor	affecting	safe	haven	currencies	and	thus	the	JPY.	Jaeggi	et	al	(2016)	further	found	that	in	the	post-2013	period,	the	main	statistically	significant	drivers	of	the	Yen	exchange	rate	have	remained	macroeconomic	surprises.	This	implies	that	the	BOJ’s	implementation	of	QQE	in	2013	had	no	large	influence	on	the	JPY,	raising	more	questions	regarding	the	effectiveness	of	the	BOJ’s	policy	measures	and	the	validity	of	Kim	and	Kang’s	(2011)	findings.		In	contrast	to	previous	literature,	Jaeggi	et	al’s	(2016)	more	thorough	by-country	analysis	offered	insight	regarding	geographic	factors	determining	the	Japanese	exchange	rate.	Since	factors	from	all	around	the	world	seem	to	influence	the	Yen,	a	Japan-centric	analysis	will	not	be	sufficient	in	explaining	the	Yen’s	irregular	movements.	A	more	global	approach	is	needed	to	find	potential	factors	and	answer	this	paper’s	research	question.	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010),	and	Koypl	and	Lee	(2016)	did	not	provided	this	insight.	Lastly,	Jaeggi	et	al	(2016)	concluded	that	the	Yen	typically	appreciates	more	than	it	depreciates	when	subject	to	macroeconomic	surprises	of	similar	magnitude,	despite	the	relevant	t-statistics	being	too	high	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	asymmetric	reactions.	This	occurrence	illustrates	that	this	whole	paper	might	be	characterized	by	a	certain	degree	of	subjectivity	and	that	the	authors’	conclusions	may	be	misleading.		Having	established	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	examined	the	underlying	factors	attributed	to	safe	haven	currencies.	The	authors	studied	52	currencies	from	advanced	and	emerging	countries	and	their	monthly	rates	against	the	USD	between	1986	and	2009.	The	independent	variables	used	in	their	model	accounted	for	carry	trade	effects,	foreign	exchange	market	interventions,	and	a	country’s	risk	and	vulnerability	characteristics,	which	included	the	inflation	rate,	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	and	the	current	account	balance.	Moreover,	Habib	and	Stracca	
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(2011)	also	addressed	financial	market	size	by	incorporating	stock	market	capitalization,	liquidity	by	measuring	the	bid-ask	spread	in	the	foreign	exchange	market,	and	potential	restrictions	on	capital	flows.	Contrary	to	previous	authors,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	included,	in	addition	to	the	VIX,	two	additional	proxies	for	global	volatility.	These	were	Merill	Lynch’s	Risk	Aversion	Indicator,	which	reflects	risk	in	the	bond,	stock,	and	foreign	exchange	market,	and	the	Global	Index	of	Financial	Turbulences	used	by	the	ECB.	This	combination	offered	a	more	comprehensive	coverage	of	global	risk	aversion	compared	to	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	and	Coudert	et	al	(2014).	The	results	indicated	that	only	a	few	factors	included	in	the	study	are	associated	with	safe	haven	currencies.	First,	a	country’s	net	foreign	asset	position	(NFAP)	is	a	significant	factor,	as	it	indicates	a	country’s	external	vulnerability.	The	coefficient	of	this	variable	was	negative,	implying	that	currencies	of	countries	with	high	NFAP	tend	to	appreciate	during	volatile	times.	This	underlines	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	as	Japan’s	NFAP	is	one	of	the	largest	in	the	world,	caused	by	ongoing	positive	current	account	balances	and	low	domestic	yields	that	force	investors	to	search	for	higher	yields	abroad.	Graph	12	illustrates	Japan’s	NFAP,	which	now	equals	70%	of	GDP.	During	crisis	periods,	this	high	position	puts	appreciative	pressure	on	the	Yen,	as	Japanese	investors,	influenced	by	the	home	bias,	rebalance	their	portfolios	towards	more	culturally	familiar	and	geographically	near-by	assets.	This	sell-off	of	foreign	assets	for	Yen-denominated	assets	is	especially	pronounced	in	Japan	due	to	the	country’s	large	NFAP	and	its	investors’	strong	home	bias	(Yoshino	and	Vollmer,	2014).	For	instance,	the	strong	home	bias	is	highlighted	in	a	study	conducted	by	Tesar	and	Werner	(1995),	which	revealed	that	Japanese	investors’	domestic	equity	holdings	as	percent	of	total	equity	holdings	equaled	95%.		
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Latsos	and	Schnabl	(2015)	provided	a	similar	conclusion	when	evaluating	the	impact	of	Japan’s	current	account	surplus	and	NFAP	on	the	Japanese	Yen.	The	authors	found	that	currencies	of	countries	with	high	current	account	surpluses	and	high	NFAP	are	under	constant	pressure	to	appreciate,	as	domestic	rates	increase	in	response	to	the	lack	of	funding	liquidity	caused	by	these	ongoing	capital	outflows	(Latsos	and	Schnabl,	2015).	Thus,	both	studies	imply	that	Japan’s	NFAP	could	explain	some	of	the	unexpected	variability	in	the	Yen	rate.	Next,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	discovered	that	market	liquidity	is	a	significant	factor	associated	with	safe	haven	assets	for	advanced	economies,	which	is	plausible	because	the	overall	decrease	in	market	liquidity	during	economic	downturns	increases	its	attractiveness.	Since	the	Japanese	currency	is	the	third	most	traded	currency	in	the	world,	one	can	assume	that	the	Japanese	security	market	is	more	liquid	relative	to	other	markets,	highlighting	the	JPY’s	safe	haven	status.		When	examining	the	effects	of	liquidity	on	exchange	rates,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	observed	that	higher	market	liquidity	coincides	with	stronger	depreciation	during	crisis	periods.	This	result	can	be	slightly	puzzling.	From	one	perspective,	more	liquid	markets	enable	investors	to	sell-off	their	assets	faster	and	invest	elsewhere,	while	less	liquid	markets	might	pose	greater	barriers	for	quick	asset	sales	due	to	the	cost	disadvantages	of	larger	bid-ask	spreads.	Consequently,	capital	flees	liquid	markets	faster,	leading	to	a	sharper	depreciation,	while	flowing	out	of	illiquid	markets	slower,	resulting	in	a	weaker	depreciation.	On	the	other	hand,	investors	value	liquidity,	which	suggests	that	crisis	periods	and	the	resulting	decrease	in	global	liquidity	should	increase	capital	flows	into	more	liquid	markets	as	investors	seek	exchanges	that	enable	quick	and	cost-effective	security	sales	should	the	crisis	worsen.	This	would	appreciate	the	local	currency.		
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Overall,	the	authors’	results	indicate	that	higher	market	liquidity	facilitates	quicker	capital	outflows	and	that	barriers	imposed	by	higher	bid-ask	spreads	seem	to	outweigh	investors’	desire	for	liquidity.	Nonetheless,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	failed	to	provide	a	valid	explanation	for	their	result,	which	decreases	its	credibility.	Consequently,	it	will	be	necessary	to	examine	whether	a	significant	relationship	between	liquidity	and	exchange	rates	actually	exists	and	how	it	affects	the	JPY.		Lastly,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	concluded	that	the	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio	is	a	significant	factor	associated	with	safe	haven	assets	for	advanced	economies.	The	variable’s	coefficient	is	negative,	meaning	that	currencies	of	countries	with	high	debt	burdens	qualify	as	safe	havens	and	appreciate	during	risk-off	periods.	While	Japan’s	enormous	debt	burden	of	230%	of	GDP	would,	according	to	this	study,	validate	the	Yen’s	status	as	a	safe	haven	currency,	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	finding	is	counterintuitive,	as	a	higher	debt	burden	raises	concerns	regarding	its	sustainability	and,	especially	during	crisis	periods,	potential	sovereign	debt	crisis.	Hence,	rationally	seen,	one	would	associate	higher	debt-to-GDP	ratios	with	capital	outflows	during	crisis	periods	and	thus	a	weaker	domestic	currency.	Again,	the	authors	failed	to	explain	this	contradictory	finding,	as	no	clear	reasoning	was	provided.	One	potential	explanation	is	that	the	significance	of	the	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio	in	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2014)	model	was	potentially	caused	by	the	Yen	itself,	as	it	is,	along	with	the	US	Dollar	and	the	Swiss	Franc,	the	only	safe	haven	currency	identified	by	literature.	This	would	imply	the	variable’s	significance	was	caused	by	reverse	causality.	However,	this	then	raises	the	question	of	how	Japan	qualified	as	a	safe	haven	in	the	first	place,	because	Japan’s	debt	could	have	negative	economic	consequences	during	crisis.		Japan’s	debt	burden	has	been	rising	in	the	past	decades	and	recently	reached	levels	close	to	230%	of	GDP,	which	is	the	highest	debt-to-GDP	ratio	in	the	developed	
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world.	Nonetheless,	low	yields	on	10-year	Japanese	government	bonds	(JGB)	indicate	that	Japan’s	debt	is	regarded	as	a	safe	investment	by	investors.	One	argument	is	that	despite	massive	gross	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	Japan’s	net	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	which	accounts	for	income	from	financial	assets	owned	by	the	Japanese	government,	the	BOJ,	and	the	Japanese	pension	fund,	is	a	mere	144%	of	GDP	(Yoshino	and	Vollmer,	2014).	This	makes	Japan’s	debt	look	much	more	sustainable.	Another	explanation	is	that	domestic	investors	hold	92%	of	Japan’s	government	debt,	which	highlights	the	Japanese	government’s	ability	to	absorb	most	of	its	debt	domestically	(Yoshino	and	Vollmer,	2014).	In	addition,	43%	of	total	government	debt	is	held	by	public	investors	and	76.4%	by	Japanese	insurance	companies,	pension	funds,	and	banks,	compared	to	only	2.2%	owned	by	Japanese	households	(Horioka	et	al,	2013).	Thus,	these	statistics	highlight	that	Japan’s	debt	is	less	volatile	and	prone	to	exogenous	shocks,	since	institutions	and	funds	follow	buy-and	hold	strategies,	in	contrast	to	more	irrational	individual	investors.	This,	combined	with	Japanese	investors’	strong	home	bias	and	therefore	low	willingness	to	shift	investments	abroad,	underlines	that	a	sudden	sell-off	of	JGB	is	unlikely.	Lastly,	due	to	ongoing	QQE,	the	BOJ	holds,	as	of	October	2016,	40%	of	all	JGBs	outstanding,	on	which	the	Japanese	government	doesn’t	pay	interest	(JMA,	2016).		All	these	findings	underscore	that	Japan’s	government	debt	is	stable	and	a	sovereign	debt	crisis	not	very	probable.	Yoshino	and	Vollmer	(2014)	and	Horioka	et	al’s	(2013)	content	complement	each	other	well,	as	both	analyzed	Japan’s	debt	issue	from	different	perspectives,	but	would	each	alone	fail	to	offer	the	full	breath	of	information	needed	to	critically	evaluate	this	topic.	Both	studies	further	explain	why	the	Yen	qualified	as	a	safe	have	asset	despite	Japan’s	massive	government	debt	and	that	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	results	regarding	the	debt-to-GDP	ratio	probably	resulted	from	reverse	causality.		
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Nonetheless,	Japan’s	debt	burden	might	worsen	in	the	near	future.	The	country	is	facing	declining	tax	revenues	due	to	weak	economic	growth	and	rising	pension	costs	due	to	its	aging	population.	In	2013	alone,	31%	of	the	government	budget	went	towards	social	security	payments,	while	11%	went	towards	interest	payments.	Furthermore,	the	savings	rate	among	Japanese	households	has	decreased	from	15.1%	in	1991	to	5%	of	GDP	in	2009.	While	this	may	signal	higher	consumption,	which	is	beneficial	for	economic	growth,	this	also	indicates	that	Japan’s	ability	to	absorb	its	debt	domestically	is	deteriorating.	Thus,	one	needs	to	closely	monitor	Japan’s	debt	structure,	because	maintaining	the	status	quo	might	turn	Japan’s	debt	into	a	poisonous	pill	that	will	eventually	harm	economic	growth.	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	different	approach	gave	insight	into	three	new	variables	potentially	explaining	the	Yen’s	behavior	and	possibly	answering	this	paper’s	research	question.	As	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	data	ranged	until	2009,	it	will	be	highly	interesting	to	analyze	whether	post-financial	crisis	developments	distorted	these	variables’	influence	on	the	most	recent	Yen	movements.						 The	life-cycle	hypothesis	developed	by	Modigliani	and	Brumberg	explains	how	age	influences	savings	and	consumption.	First,	young	individuals	expect	higher	salaries	in	the	future,	whereas	retirees	have	high	savings	in	their	deposits.	Therefore,	both	age	groups	are	likely	to	consume	proportionally	more	relative	to	the	middle-aged	individual	who	must	curb	consumption	and	increase	savings	to	prepare	for	retirement.	Regarding	fertility	rates	and	exchange	rates,	the	life-cycle	theory	argues	that	an	increase	in	the	fertility	rate	raises	consumption,	specifically	for	non-tradable	goods,	as	households	spend	money	on	their	children’s	education.	Households	finance	this	by	depleting	their	own	savings	and	as	these	savings	re-enter	the	market,	firms	witness	higher	profits,	re-invest	these,	and	hence	increase	investments	in	the	economy.	This	combination	of	
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higher	investments	and	consumption	then	spurs	economic	growth,	to	which	the	central	bank	will	respond	by	raising	its	policy	rate	to	prevent	the	economy	from	overheating.	This	will	attract	foreign	capital,	lead	to	a	capital	inflow,	and	appreciate	the	domestic	currency.	Similarly,	retirees	have	excess	savings	that	they	mainly	use	for	consumption	of	non-tradable	goods,	such	as	health	care,	which	leads	to	further	appreciative	currency	pressure.			 To	investigate	the	validity	of	this	hypothesis,	Rose	et	al	(2009)	analyzed	data	from	89	countries	between	1975-2005.	Variables	included	the	fertility	rate	and	several	economic	indicators,	such	as	the	ratio	of	national	to	US	GDP	per	capita,	real	GDP	growth,	and	government	spending	as	percent	of	GDP.	The	results	aligned	with	the	life-cycle	hypothesis	and	were	statistically	significant,	which	highlights	that	a	relationship	between	fertility	rates	and	real	exchange	rates	exists	(Rose	et	al,	2009).	For	instance,	a	decrease	from	three	to	two	children	per	mother	would	lead	to	a	currency	depreciation	of	roughly	15%.	Although	the	model’s	𝑅"	of	10%	indicates	that	fertility	alone	cannot	explain	much	of	the	variation	in	a	country’s	real	exchange	rate,	it	might	still	be	a	significant	factor	affecting	the	JPY.	In	contrast	to	Rose	et	al	(2009),	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006)	looked	at	the	general	demographic	structure	of	an	economy	to	draw	implications	regarding	the	real	exchange	rate.	The	authors	hypothesized	that	changes	in	birth	rates	and	thus	population	structures	have	important	long-run	implications	for	economic	growth,	as	this	will	impact	the	future	labor	force	size,	tax	revenues,	and	pension	payments.		Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006)	obtained	annual	real	exchange	rate	and	demographic	data	for	25	OECD	countries	and	divided	this	dataset	into	six	different	age	groups	based	on	consumption,	income,	and	savings	behavior.	These	were	children,	0-14	years,	young	adults,	15-24,	prime	age,	25-49,	middle	age,	50-64,	young	retirees,	65-74,	
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and	old	retirees,	75+.	Similar	to	the	observations	made	by	Rose	et	al	(2009),	the	authors	found	that	a	country’s	age	structure	significantly	impacts	the	real	exchange	rate.	People	actively	participating	in	the	workforce	have	a	depreciating	effect	on	the	real	exchange	rate,	as	they	tend	to	consume	less	and	save	more.	Contrarily,	retirees	have	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	real	exchange	rate	due	to	their	relatively	higher	consumption	rates.	In	addition,	one	could	speculate	that	a	proportion	of	retiree’s	savings	include	assets	denominated	in	foreign	currencies,	a	very	plausible	scenario	in	Japan	where	the	NFAP	is	very	high.	As	retirees	lack	income,	they	probably	frequently	exchange	foreign	assets	for	domestic	currency,	which	would	lead	to	further	constant	appreciative	pressure.	This	interpretation	aligns	with	Masson	et	al’s	(1993)	results,	which	provided	statistically	significant	evidence	of	a	positive	long-run	relationship	between	net	foreign	asset	ratios	and	an	aging	population.	Overall,	Andersson	and	Oesterholm’s	(2006)	method	of	dividing	their	dataset	by	age	enabled	a	more	detailed	analysis	relative	to	Rose	et	al	(2009).	While	Rose	et	al	(2009)	and	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006)	took	a	broad	approach	by	linking	demographic	changes	to	currencies	of	numerous	countries,	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009)	focused	on	the	relationship	between	demography,	economic	growth,	and	the	USDJPY	real	exchange	rate.	They	assumed	that	the	strong	Yen	appreciation	in	the	postwar	period	was	partially	influenced	by	Japan’s	aging	population	problem	beginning	in	the	1970’s	and	thus	demographic	change	(Aloy	and	Gente,	2009).	After	evaluating	empirical	data,	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009)	found	that	the	decrease	in	population	growth	had	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	real	USDJPY	exchange	rate	between	1971-2000.	Similar	to	Andersson	and	Oesterholm’s	(2006)	reasoning,	the	authors	argued	that	an	older	population’s	higher	level	of	consumption	puts	appreciative	pressure	on	the	Dollar-Yen	exchange	rate.	Moreover,	a	slowdown	in	population	growth	implies	fewer	
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entrants	into	the	economy	without	financial	assets,	which	raises	the	net	financial	wealth	per	capita	of	a	country	and	puts	further	upward	pressure	on	the	Yen’s	value.		In	contrast	to	Rose	et	al	(2009)	and	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006),	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009)	failed	to	explain	the	theoretical	implications	behind	their	econometric	results.	No	clarifications,	criticism,	or	further	details	regarding	the	obtained	estimates	were	provided,	and	furthermore,	only	one	control	variable,	the	real	interest	rate	differential,	was	used	in	this	model.	Thus,	while	this	paper	offered	more	direct	insights	into	the	Yen’s	relationship	with	demographic	changes,	a	more	thorough	analysis	is	needed	to	get	a	full	understanding	of	this	connection.	Nevertheless,	despite	some	deficits,	these	three	papers	gave	rise	to	another	variable	potentially	explaining	the	Yen’s	abnormal	behavior,	namely	demographic	changes.	Due	to	Japan’s	well-known	social	and	economic	challenges	related	to	its	aging	population,	it	will	be	interesting	to	validate	its	significance	and	examine	its	impact	on	the	Yen	later	in	this	paper.		Japan	is	isolated	from	the	rest	of	Asia	by	an	ocean	and	lacks	many	natural	resources,	which	makes	it	highly	dependent	on	commodity	imports.	Due	to	the	importance	of	its	manufacturing	sector,	it	especially	depends	on	oil	imports,	and	hence	is	vulnerable	to	any	sudden	changes	in	oil	prices.	Tokuo	and	Hayato	(2015)	looked	more	closely	at	this	matter	and	its	impact	on	the	Yen	exchange	rate.	The	authors	found	that	increases	in	crude	oil	prices	depreciate	the	Yen	and	argued	that	the	Yen’s	sharp	appreciation	after	the	2008	financial	crisis	can	be	attributed	to	both	decreased	global	economic	activity	and	a	fall	in	crude	oil	prices.	These	observations	are	supported	by	empirical	evidence,	as	lower	oil	prices	in	the	mid	1980’s	increased	the	Yen’s	value.	Tokuo	and	Hagato’s	(2015)	study	implies	that	oil	price	decreases	lower	costs	for	Japanese	companies.	This,	keeping	all	else	constant,	implies	higher	profitability	and	competitiveness	for	Japanese	firms,	which	facilitates	additional	economic	growth,	
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increases	the	probability	of	upcoming	policy	rate	increases	by	the	BOJ,	and	subsequently	appreciates	the	Yen.	A	drawback	in	Tokuo	and	Hayato’s	(2015)	paper	is	the	vague	and	ambiguous	description	of	their	methodology,	which	decreases	the	paper’s	creditworthiness.	Nonetheless,	since	the	authors’	conclusion	is	highly	believable,	its	significance	will	be	analyzed	later	in	this	paper.	Thus,	in	addition	to	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	Japan’s	NFAP,	demographic	changes,	the	market	environment,	and	liquidity,	the	potential	significance	of	oil	prices	on	the	Japanese	Yen	could	further	help	explain	why	the	Yen	seems	to	be	immune	to	the	BOJ’s	policy	implementations.			 Christic-David	and	Chaudhry	(2000)	offered	one	further	insight	into	the	Japanese	exchange	rate	debate	that	had	only	been	partially	addressed	by	Jaeggi	et	al	(2011),	namely	the	link	between	domestic	macroeconomic	news	announcements	and	the	Yen.	Data	used	to	analyze	this	relationship	included	intraday	futures	data	in	15	minutes	intervals	from	01/1994	–	12/1996	and	21	different	types	of	news	announcements.	The	authors	found	that	Yen	futures	rates,	and	therefore	indirectly	Yen	spot	rates,	are	most	significantly	affected	by	employment	reports.	In	addition,	Japan’s	trade	deficit,	industrial	production,	and	capacity	utilization	influence	the	Yen	exchange	rate	as	well.		Hashimoto	and	Ito	(2010)	went	into	more	detail	and	analyzed	how	Japanese	macroeconomic	news	impacts	the	Dollar-Yen	exchange	rate	immediately	after	the	news	announcement.	Similarly	to	Christic-David	and	Chaudhry’s	(2000)	results,	the	two	authors	found	that,	among	others,	industrial	production,	price	indices,	and	unemployment	news	significantly	impact	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate.	When	good	news	exceeds	expectations,	it	implies	a	stronger	Japanese	economy,	which	will	most	likely	lead	to	policy	rate	increases	and	a	Yen	appreciation.	Overall,	both	journals	offered	
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insight	into	more	potential	macroeconomic	variables	that	could	further	strengthen	the	expandability	of	this	paper’s	model	and	answer	its	main	research	question.		
	
IV.	Methodology	Section:	This	paper’s	regression	analysis	examines	the	impact	of	variables	identified	by	literature	and	other	factors	assumed	to	be	important	on	the	Japanese	exchange	rate,	with	the	aim	to	find	factors	that	explain	the	Yen’s	exchange	rate	and	understand	the	implications	for	investors	that	wish	to	rebalance	their	portfolios	towards	Yen-denominated	assets.		The	dependent	variable	is	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate,	as	indicated	previously	in	this	paper.	Both	currencies	are	highly	liquid	and	offer	an	accurate	representation	of	the	Japanese	Yen’s	value.		The	first	independent	variable	in	this	model	is	the	USDJPY	lag	variable,	which	illustrates	the	previous	day’s	Yen	exchange	rate	against	the	US	Dollar.	This	variable	was	not	mentioned	in	the	literature	and	adds	value	to	the	discussion,	since	yesterday’s	rate	may	heavily	influence	today’s	exchange	rate.	This	assumption	is	based	on	the	momentum	effect	introduced	by	Jegadeesh	and	Titman	(1993),	who	explained	that	recent	past	winners	tend	to	outperform	recent	past	losers.	The	two	authors	reasoned	that	security	prices	gradually,	not	immediately,	incorporate	all	available	information,	which	results	in	predictable	price	drifts.	Contrarily,	the	weak	form	of	the	efficient	market	hypothesis	advocated	by	Fama	(1970)	states	that	current	asset	prices	reflect	all	available	information	regarding	past	prices	and	movements	and	only	change	in	response	to	new	information.	Because	new	information	itself	is	unpredictable,	it	is	not	possible	to	forecast	future	asset	prices.	Hence,	an	increase	in	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate	yesterday	has	no	implications	for	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate	today.	Because	both	
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theories	sound	plausible,	no	predictions	can	be	made	regarding	the	coefficient	of	the	USDJPY	lag	variable,	USDJPYt1.	The	second	independent	variable	included	in	the	model	is	the	real	BOJ’s	policy	rate.	Its	attractiveness	stems	from	its	usefulness	as	a	proxy	for	Japanese	monetary	policy,	the	discrepancy	between	Kim	and	Kang	(2013)	and	Ueda’s	(2012)	findings,	and	the	potential	inefficiency	of	Japan’s	monetary	policy	in	increasing	the	domestic	money	supply.	Therefore,	the	inclusion	of	this	variable	enables	a	clear	analysis	on	whether	the	BOJ’s	monetary	policy	efforts	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	JPY.	A	high	real	BOJ	policy	rate	indicates	a	contractionary	monetary	policy,	while	a	low	rate	implies	an	accommodative	policy.	Although	economic	theories	would	suggest	a	negative	coefficient	for	the	BOJ	variable,	empirical	evidence	indicates	that	the	BOJ’s	monetary	policy	measures	failed	to	influence	the	Japanese	Yen.	Thus,	it	is	assumed	that	this	variable	is	insignificant	and	its	coefficient	unpredictable.	Next	the	VIX	used	by	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010),	and	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	was	added	to	help	account	for	increased	global	uncertainty	and	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status.	Graph	6	illustrates	the	historical	movement	of	the	VIX	and	its	spikes	seem	to	coincide	with	periods	of	Yen	appreciation.	As	the	VIX	increases,	global	uncertainty	rises,	investors	become	more	risk-averse,	and	more	capital	flows	into	safe	haven	assets,	including	Yen-denominated	assets.	Contrary	to	the	literature,	this	model	does	not	use	the	VIX	as	a	dummy	variable,	but	as	a	flow	variable,	because	both	small	and	large	volatility	spikes	should	have	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	Yen.	Other	measures	of	global	volatility	used	by	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	and	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	were	excluded	due	to	potential	double	counting	and	because	the	global	reach	of	all	firms	represented	on	the	S&P500	is	sufficient	to	capture	global	risk	aversion.	In	addition,	the	Nikkei,	Dax,	and	S&P500	futures	indexes	suggested	by	Ranaldo	and	
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Soederlind	(2010)	were	excluded	for	a	similar	reason,	since	the	correlation	between	these	variables	and	the	VIX	seemed	too	strong.	Overall,	the	coefficient	of	the	VIX	should	be	negative,	as	implied	by	literature.	When	global	uncertainty	increases,	the	Yen	should	appreciate.	While	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	found	that	liquidity	is	an	important	characteristic	of	safe	haven	assets,	this	variable	turned-out	to	be	insignificant	in	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	study.	It	is	still	incorporated	in	this	paper’s	model,	since	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	dataset	only	ranged	from	1993-2008,	a	much	shorter	time	period	compared	to	this	paper’s	data	set.	In	addition,	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	found	that	higher	market	liquidity	coincides	with	stronger	depreciation	during	risk-off	periods.	This	notion	seems	false,	as	previously	outlined,	and	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	compared	to	the	literature	will	be	run	to	examine	this	relationship.	To	capture	liquidity,	the	TED	spread	used	by	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	was	included.	The	variable	is	assumed	to	have	a	negative	coefficient,	the	opposite	of	what	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	suggested,	because	investors	typically	pay	premiums	for	additional	liquidity,	especially	during	crisis	periods.		Both	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	and	Latsos	and	Schnabl	(2015)	found	that	a	country’s	NFAP	is	associated	with	safe	haven	assets	and	that	a	high	NFAP	puts	appreciative	pressure	on	the	underlying	currency.	Similar	to	the	authors,	this	paper	assumes	that	Japan’s	NFAP	has	significant	implications	for	the	Japanese	Yen	and	therefore	included	it	in	this	model.	There	is	no	clear	expectations	regarding	the	sign	of	its	coefficient,	since	an	increasing	NFAP	puts	depreciative	pressure	on	a	currency	due	to	constant	capital	outflows,	while	it	puts	strong	appreciative	pressure	on	a	currency	during	crisis	periods	due	to	Japanese	investors’	strong	home	bias.		
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Additional	variables	reflecting	Japan’s	macroeconomic	conditions	were	included	to	decrease	the	model’s	dependency	on	US	data.	While	the	Bloomberg-based	variable	utilized	by	Jaeggi	et	al	(2016)	was	unavailable,	Japan’s	GDP	growth	rate	data	was	obtained	as	a	proxy	for	its	market	environment,	which	had	not	been	done	in	previous	studies.	Its	coefficient	should	be	negative,	based	on	the	earlier	discussion	in	the	analytical	framework	regarding	higher	economic	growth,	monetary	tightening,	and	capital	inflows.	Japan’s	unemployment	rate	and	industrial	production	were	added	as	well,	since	Christic-David	(2000)	and	Hashimoto	and	Ito	(2010)	found	that	both	macroeconomic	variables	significantly	affect	the	Yen.	The	coefficient	for	unemployment	should	be	positive,	since	higher	levels,	similar	to	low	GDP	growth,	may	incentivize	the	BOJ	to	ease	its	monetary	policy	measures	and	depreciate	the	Yen.	This	variable	was	built-in	despite	its	correlation	with	GDP	growth	rates	because	Japan’s	economy	has	long	been	characterized	by	low	unemployment	despite	sluggish	GDP	growth.	Thus,	there	might	not	be	a	clear	linear	correlation	between	these	two	variables,	which	justifies	its	inclusion	in	the	model.		
Similarly,	quarterly	data	was	available	for	industrial	production	growth	rates,	while	GDP	growth	rates	were	only	obtainable	on	an	annual	basis,	implying	that	the	inclusion	of	the	industrial	production	variable	may	offer	a	more	accurate	view	of	Japan’s	economic	situation.	A	high	level	of	industrial	production	would	indicate	that	Japanese	firms	work	at	high	capacity	and	reap	economies	of	scale,	while	a	lower	value	would	imply	low	asset	utilization.	Similar	to	the	GDP	variable,	industrial	production	growth	should	have	a	negative	coefficient,	since	higher	levels	imply	a	strong	economy,	which	appreciates	the	Yen.	For	all	three	macroeconomic	variables,	the	expected	relationship	with	the	JPYUSD	was	not	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	literature.	
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Studies	undertaken	by	Rose	et	al	(2009),	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006),	and	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009)	highlighted	the	important	link	between	demographic	structures,	consumption	patterns,	and	exchange	rates	and	hence,	a	proxy	for	people	above	65	in	Japan	was	included	to	address	Japan’s	aging	population	problem	and	draw	potential	implications	for	the	Japanese	Yen.	Its	coefficient	is	expect	to	be	negative	due	to	the	appreciative	effect	of	retirees	on	a	currency,	stemming	from	their	relatively	higher	consumption	levels,	as	assumed	by	literature,	and	their	constant	sell-offs	of	foreign	assets	for	domestic	currency,	as	hypothesized	earlier.	
The	choice	for	the	last	independent	variable,	oil	prices,	was	based-off	the	study	conducted	by	Tokuo	and	Hayato	(2015).	Since	increases	in	crude	oil	prices	were	said	to	decrease	the	competitiveness	of	Japanese	manufacturers,	harm	economic	growth,	and	depreciate	the	Yen,	this	variable	should	have	a	positive	coefficient.	All	variables	are	summarized	and	labeled	in	Table	2.		
The	debt-to-GDP	variable	mentioned	by	Habib	and	Stracca	(2011)	was	excluded	for	two	reasons.	First,	literature	by	Horioka	et	al	(2013)	and	Yoshino	and	Vollmer	(2014)	highlighted	that	the	debt	variable’s	significance	in	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	study	probably	originated	from	reverse	causality.	Second,	its	strong	link	with	the	GDP	variable	causes	multicollinearity	in	this	paper’s	model.	Multicollinearity	was	further	minimized	by	combining	the	inflation	and	BOJ	policy	rate	variables	into	the	real	BOJ	policy	rate	mentioned	earlier.	
The	data	ranges	from	01/02/1990	until	12/31/2014,	which	is	much	more	comprehensive	and	current	compared	to	most	studies.	Data	on	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate,	the	VIX,	oil	prices,	and	the	TED	spread	were	collected	on	a	daily	basis.	Data	on	Japan’s	aging	population,	GDP	growth	rate,	and	NFAP	were	obtained	on	an	annual	basis,	
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while	the	real	BOJ’s	policy	rate	and	Japan’s	unemployment	rate	were	obtained	on	a	monthly	basis	and	Japan’s	industrial	production	growth	rate	on	a	quarterly	basis.	To	match	all	different	time	periods,	all	annual,	quarterly,	and	monthly	data	points	were	inserted	into	each	period’s	daily	columns	to	represent	their	respective	time	period’s	values.	This	paper	focuses	on	daily	data,	because	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	and	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010)	highlighted	that	high-frequency	data	yields	superior	results.	
The	USDJPY	exchange	rate	and	oil	price	data	came	from	Data	Planet.	As	the	US	Dollar-Japanese	Yen	exchange	rate	was	obtained,	a	lower	value	indicates	a	stronger	Yen	and	thus	an	appreciation.	Oil	futures	were	used,	because	futures	trade	outside	trading	hours	and	thus	offer	a	more	accurate	depiction	of	current	values.	Next,	data	on	the	TED	spread,	unemployment	rate,	and	industrial	production	growth	rate	were	collected	from	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis.	Furthermore,	the	World	Bank’s	database	provided	Japan’s	GDP	growth	rate	and	its	NFAP,	the	Bank	of	Japan’s	official	website	the	real	BOJ’s	policy	rates,	and	Knoema.com	data	on	Japan’s	population	above	65.	Lastly,	data	on	the	VIX	index	was	available	on	the	Chicago	Board	Options	Exchange	website.	A	summary	of	the	data	is	shown	in	Table	6.		
The	following	equation	will	be	the	population	regression	function	for	my	analysis:	
USDJPYi = β0 +β1 *USDJPYt1i +β2 *VIXi +β3 *Oili +β4 *TEDi 					
+β5 *Popi +β6 *GDPi +β7 *NFAPi +β8 *Unemi +β9 * I Prodi 	
+β10 * realBOJi + ei 			 The	population	regression	function	highlights	that	the	Dollar-Yen	exchange	rate	
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is	the	dependent	variable,	which	is	assumed	to	be	influenced	by	the	independent	variables	yesterday’s	Yen	exchange	rate,	global	volatility,	oil	prices,	the	TED	spread,	Japan’s	population	above	65,	the	real	BOJ’s	policy	rate,	Japan’s	GDP	and	industrial	production	growth	rate,	net	foreign	asset	position,	and	unemployment.	As	discussed	earlier,	the	variables	VIX,	Oil,	TED,	Pop,	realBOJ,	NFAP,	Unem,	and	IProd	were	all	clearly	stated	in	the	literature.	Thus,	the	addition	of	the	lag	exchange	rate	and	GDP	growth	rate	variables	as	well	as	the	data’s	longer	timespan	add	value	to	the	discussion.	Next,	the	functional	form	used	is	a	linear	model,	which	aligns	with	the	literature.	This	is	because	the	relationship	between	the	USDJPY	variable	and	all	independent	variables	seems	linear,	not	quadratic	or	cubic.		
This	model	is	a	time	series,	which	makes	it	necessary	to	check	for	multicollinearity	and	autocorrelation.	First,	the	variance	inflation	factor,	VIF,	was	calculated	for	all	independent	variables	to	test	for	multicollinearity.	The	results,	summarized	in	Table	3,	show	that	all	variables,	except	for	the	NFAP,	do	not	suffer	from	multicollinearity,	as	their	VIFs	are	below	5.	Furthermore,	the	VIF	for	NFAP	is	a	mere	5.81,	implying	that	imperfect	multicollinearity	is	a	minor	issue	in	this	model.	To	test	for	autocorrelation,	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate	was	predicted	using	the	OLS	estimates	and	the	associated	sample	error	plotted	against	time.	This	plot	is	shown	in	Graph	7	and	exhibits	no	clear	pattern,	indicating	that	there	is	no	relationship	among	errors	and	thus	no	autocorrelation	in	my	model.	For	clarification	purposes,	the	Durbin-Watson	test	was	run.	The	results	are	shown	in	Table	9	and	further	emphasize	that	the	model	does	not	suffer	from	autocorrelation.	Therefore,	all	estimates	are	BLUE	and	fulfill	the	classical	assumptions.		
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V.	Discussion	of	Results	
The	results	of	the	regression	analysis	are	shown	in	Table	1.	The	OLS	estimates	for	oil	prices,	Japan’s	population	above	65,	and	GDP	deviate	from	this	paper’s	initial	expectations.	First,	higher	oil	prices	seem	to	have	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	JPY.	Keeping	all	else	constant,	a	$10	increase	in	crude	oil	prices	leads	to	a	Yen	appreciation	of	0.004,	which	contradicts	Tokuo	and	Hayato’s	(2015)	findings.	The	two	authors	argued	that	higher	oil	prices	depreciate	the	Yen.	One	explanation	may	be	the	high	level	of	efficiency	at	which	Japanese	firms	operate,	particularly	in	the	Japanese	car-manufacturing	sector.	If	one	assumes	that	higher	oil	prices	affect	manufacturers	around	the	globe	equally,	Japanese	firms	might	simply	be	better	prepared	to	manage	rising	energy	costs	compared	to	their	foreign	competitors.	This	would	imply	that	rising	oil	prices	could	actually	benefit	Japanese	companies,	boost	Japan’s	GDP,	and	lead	to	capital	inflows.		
Another	argument	is	that	higher	production	costs	for	Japanese	firms	associated	with	oil	price	increases	are	often	directly	transferred	to	the	end	consumer	through	higher	prices.	This	causes	inflation,	to	which	the	BOJ	will	respond	by	increasing	its	policy	rate.	The	subsequent	deceleration	in	the	money	supply	increase	will	result	in	a	stronger	Yen.	Tokuo	and	Hayato’s	(2015)	findings	differed	since	the	authors	ignored	the	strategic	changes	implemented	by	Japanese	firms,	who	responded	to	rising	costs	by	shifting	production	towards	higher-value,	less	price-elastic	goods.	This	decreased	their	vulnerability	to	oil	shocks	(Klitgaard,	1996).	Investor	should	take	away	that	investing	in	Japanese	oil	companies	might	come	with	high	volatility,	since	decreases	in	oil	prices	will	harm	these	firms’	profit	margins	as	well	as	cause	exchange	rate	related	losses	for	investors	due	to	the	predicted	Yen-depreciation.	Previous	literature	didn't	provide	this	
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insight.	
Next,	the	estimates	predict	that	Japan’s	elderly	population	has	a	depreciative	effect	on	the	Yen,	which	contradicts	Rose	et	al	(2009),	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006),	and	Aloy	and	Gente’s	(2009)	findings	regarding	an	aging	population	and	higher	consumption.	Nonetheless,	the	results	are	plausible	if	one	considers	an	aging	population’s	economic	implication.	While	Japan’s	elderly	people	consume	more	by	depleting	their	savings,	thus	putting	appreciative	pressure	on	the	Yen,	Japan’s	aging	population	also	puts	pressure	on	the	Japanese	government	through	pension	payments.	As	mentioned	earlier,	almost	a	third	of	Japan’s	government	budget	goes	towards	social	security	payments,	which	is	highly	unsustainable.	Similarly,	an	aging	population	requires	more	medical	attention.	More	funds	will	be	used	in	the	health	care	sector,	while	fewer	funds	will	be	available	for	other	important	investments.	Japan’s	inability	to	introduce	new	reforms	to	tackle	its	budget	problems	creates	doubts	regarding	Japan’s	economic	future.		
In	addition,	Japan’s	population	above	65	continues	to	rise	as	a	percentage	of	its	total	population,	implying	that	a	continuously	shrinking	workforce	will	have	to	finance	pension	payments	for	an	increasing	number	of	pensioners,	resulting	in	a	lower	dependency	ratio.	Therefore,	the	negative	long-term	economic	implications	of	an	aging	population,	which	include	higher	government	deficits,	labor	shortages,	and	higher	taxation	for	the	labor	force,	may	outweigh	the	economic	benefits	of	retirees	and	hence	put	downward	pressure	on	the	Yen’s	value.	The	literature	probably	failed	to	identify	this	issue,	because	it	focused	on	the	immediate	effects	of	an	aging	population,	while	ignoring	its	future	economic	implications.	Investors	should	therefore	analyze,	among	other	factors,	the	Japanese	government’s	effort	in	addressing	this	problem	before	
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engaging	in	long-term	investment	commitments.	
Lastly,	the	estimates	highlight	that	as	Japan’s	GDP	growth	increases	by	1	unit,	the	Yen	depreciates	by	0.001	units.	While	small	in	magnitude,	this	notion	contradicts	economic	theory	regarding	GDP	growth	and	capital	inflows	mentioned	in	the	analytical	framework,	as	higher	economic	growth	should	prompt	policy	rate	increases	by	the	BOJ	and	create	a	more	attractive	yield-environment	for	foreign	investors.	A	potential	explanation	is	Japan’s	volatile	and	sluggish	economic	growth	ever	since	the	asset	price	bubble	burst	in	the	early	1990’s.	Since	then,	the	BOJ	has	maintained	an	ultra	low	interest	rate	policy,	despite	some	positive	spikes	in	GDP	growth,	as	illustrated	in	Graph	1.	Graph	1	further	highlights	that	years	of	higher	GDP	growth	were	often	followed	by	economic	contraction.	Therefore,	one	can	hypothesize	that	investors,	based	on	past	experience,	expect	Japan’s	GDP	growth	rate	to	continuously	deviate	around	zero	and	any	GDP	growth	to	be	followed	by	a	GDP	decrease.	Consequently,	a	GDP	increase	in	Japan	may	prompt	a	capital	outflow	and	thus	a	depreciation	of	the	Yen,	as	investors	anticipate	future	GDP	declines,	secure	gains	before	potential	market	downturns,	and	invest	in	other	geographic	regions.	Future	investors	should	keep	this	potentially	reoccurring	pattern	in	mind.	
For	all	other	variables,	the	expectations	align	with	the	results	obtained	from	the	OLS	model.	The	VIX’s	negative	coefficient	underlines	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	and	implies	that	higher	global	volatility	appreciates	the	Yen.	This	is	consistent	with	market	consensus	and	the	findings	of	Coudert	et	al	(2014),	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016),	and	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010).	As	the	VIX	increases	by	1	unit,	the	Yen	tends	to	appreciate	by	0.005,	keeping	all	else	constant.	This	validates	that	investors	searching	for	protection	against	market	declines	should	consider	Yen-denominated	assets	as	investments.	The	
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model	also	highlights	investors’	liquidity	preference,	as	the	coefficient	for	the	TED	spread	is	negative.	This	further	aligns	with	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	expectations	and	contradicts	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	findings.	
The	OLS	estimates	indicate	that	for	every	1-unit	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate,	the	Japanese	Yen	depreciates	by	0.011	units,	keeping	all	else	constant.	This	is	intuitive,	since	higher	unemployment	generally	implies	fewer	households	with	disposable	income	available	for	consumption,	more	firms	operating	below	full	capacity,	and	a	reduction	in	tax	revenues.	As	the	future	prospects	of	a	country	deteriorate,	investors	become	more	risk	averse	and	rebalance	their	portfolios,	leading	to	a	sell-off	of	Japanese	assets.	This	capital	outflow	intensifies	if	higher	unemployment	incentivizes	the	BOJ	to	decrease	its	policy	rate.	This	conclusion	also	aligns	with	Jaeggi	et	al’s	(2016)	study,	which	suggested	that	macroeconomic	variables	significantly	impact	exchange	rates.		
Analogous	to	unemployment,	the	OLS	estimates	for	industrial	production	match	the	expectation	as	well,	according	to	which	rising	industrial	production	growth	leads	to	an	increase	in	the	Yen’s	value.	Similar	to	Hashimoto	and	Ito	(2014)	and	Christic-David	and	Chaudhry’s	(2000)	findings,	the	estimates	highlight	that	higher	industrial	production	portrays	stronger	economic	performance,	which	instigates	a	capital	inflow	and	a	currency	appreciation.	Both	findings	show	that	investors	are	advised	to	pay	close	attention	to	new	macroeconomic	data	releases.	
The	BOJ	policy	rate	variable’s	estimate	indicates	that	each	1-unit	increase	in	the	policy	rate	appreciates	the	Yen	by	0.012	units.	This	result	matches	Kim	and	Kang’s	(2013)	findings	and	aligns	with	economic	theories,	which	suggest	that	contractionary	monetary	policy	results	in	a	currency	appreciation.	So,	the	BOJ’s	policy	measures	in	fact	
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do	affect	the	Japanese	exchange	rate,	which	counters	this	paper’s	expectation	and	Ueda’s	(2012)	results.	Nonetheless,	its	small	coefficient	shows	that	the	BOJ’s	effect	is	not	very	pronounced.	Investors	should	therefore	not	put	too	much	weight	on	BOJ	policy	announcements.		
For	Japan’s	NFAP,	the	estimates	revealed	a	negative	coefficient,	meaning	that	a	high	NFAP	puts	appreciative	pressure	on	the	Yen.	This	resembles	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	conclusion	and	is	understandable,	as	an	ever-growing	NFAP	increases	the	probability	and	magnitude	of	large	capital	inflows	during	crisis	periods,	as	more	Japanese	investors	sell	their	foreign	assets	in	favor	of	domestic	assets.	This	is	especially	pronounced	in	Japan	due	to	the	presence	of	a	strong	home	bias.	Nonetheless,	a	closer	look	at	the	estimates	reveals	that	for	instance	a	$65	trillion	increase	in	Japan’s	NFAP,	a	50%	increase,	would	result	in	a	Yen	appreciation	of	a	mere	0.0205	units.	Thus,	investors	should	recognize	that	while	Japan’s	NFAP	has	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	Yen,	the	magnitude	is	negligible	and	the	appreciative	pressures	created	during	crisis	periods	are	basically	equalized	by	the	depreciative	pressures	originating	from	capital	outflows	during	less	volatile	periods.	Consequently,	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	interpretation	may	be	misguiding.	
Lastly,	the	coefficient	for	the	lagged	USDJPY	exchange	rate,	USDJPYt1,	is	positive,	which	implies	that	yesterday’s	Yen	exchange	rate	does	influence	today’s	Yen	rate.	This	hadn’t	been	identified	by	literature	and	underlines	the	validity	of	the	momentum	effect	advocated	by	Jegadeesh	and	Titman	(1993).	The	estimates	show	that	a	1-unit	appreciation	in	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate	yesterday	leads	to	a	Yen	appreciation	of	0.998	today,	stressing	that	yesterday’s	exchange	rate	has	a	large	impact	on	the	USDJPY	compared	to	all	other	independent	variables.	This	finding	further	highlights	that	the	
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weak	form	of	the	efficient	market	hypothesis	doesn’t	hold	for	the	JPY,	since	it	seems	to	not	incorporate	all	past	price	information.	The	important	message	is	that	investors	could	potentially	take	advantage	of	this	phenomenon.	If	positive	news	regarding	the	Yen	arises,	not	everything	seems	to	be	immediately	incorporated	into	the	currency	value.	Investors	can	therefore	predict	the	drift	in	the	Yen’s	value	and	profit	from	its	momentum.		
The	p-values	for	USDJPYt1	and	the	VIX	are	significant	at	the	1%	level	of	significance	and	further	validate	both	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	as	well	as	the	existence	of	the	momentum	effect.	In	addition,	the	p-value	for	IProd	equals	0.026,	stressing	its	significance	at	the	5%	level	of	significance.	All	remaining	variables	have	p-values	above	0.1,	making	them	insignificant.	This,	for	instance,	means	that	the	BOJ’s	policy	measures	do	not	significantly	impact	the	USDJPY	rate,	which	would	confirm	Ueda’s	(2012)	findings	and	the	conclusion	drawn	from	Graphs	2	and	3.	The	𝑅"	and	𝑅"	are	0.9979	and	0.9978,	respectively,	which	implies	that	this	paper’s	model	explains	the	majority	of	the	variability	in	the	Dollar-Yen	exchange	rate.	The	particularly	high	𝑅"	probably	originates	from	the	high	correlation	between	the	dependent	variable	USDJPY	and	its	lag	variable,	USDJPYt1.	Overall,	the	goodness	of	fit	is	very	high.		The	financial	crisis	of	2008	changed	the	perception	of	risk	for	many	investors	and	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	discovered	that	many	assets	that	had	safe	haven	features	before	2008	lost	these	in	the	post-Lehman	crisis	period,	indicating	that	investors	became	more	selective	in	their	search	for	safe	haven	assets.	Therefore,	two	additional	regression	analyses	were	run	to	examine	the	impact	that	the	Lehman	collapse	had	on	the	Japanese	Yen.	The	first	covers	the	pre-Lehman	crisis	period	from	01/02/1990	until	the	day	Lehman	Brothers	filed	for	bankruptcy,	09/15/2008.	The	second	regressions	
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focuses	on	the	post-Lehman	collapse	period,	which	ranges	from	09/16/2008	–	12/31/2014.	A	summary	statistic	for	both	models	is	given	in	Tables	7	and	8.	
The	results	for	both	periods	are	outlined	in	Table	1.	For	the	pre-Lehman	crisis	period,	the	estimates	resemble	those	of	the	initial	model,	with	the	GDP	and	IProd	variables	having	a	larger	impact	on	the	Yen	exchange	rate.	Keeping	all	else	constant,	each	1-unit	increase	in	IProd	now	appreciates	the	Yen	by	0.03,	compared	to	0.008	in	the	previous	model.	The	sole	exception	is	the	TED	spread,	whose	coefficient	turned	positive	and	indicates	that	lower	global	funding	liquidity	leads	to	a	Yen	depreciation.	Although	this	contradicts	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind’s	(2010)	expectation,	it	now	matches	Habib	and	Stracca’s	(2011)	results,	which	showed	that	currencies	of	highly	liquid	markets	tend	to	depreciate	during	crisis	periods.	Hence,	in	the	pre-Lehman	crisis	period,	capital	outflows	facilitated	by	more	liquid	financial	markets	seemed	to	have	outweighed	the	liquidity	desire	of	security	holders	invested	in	markets	with	higher	trading	costs	resulting	from	high	bid-ask	spreads,	as	explained	earlier.	This	change	can	be	further	explained	by	the	emergence	of	the	Internet	and	online	trading.	In	contrast	to	today,	online	trading	costs	were	significantly	higher	in	the	pre-Lehman	period	and,	combined	with	high	bid-ask	spreads,	may	have	outweighed	the	trading	benefits	for	many	investors	invested	in	illiquid	markets	during	crisis	periods.	None	of	these	insights	were	offred	by	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	and	Ranaldo	and	Soederlind	(2010).		
Finally,	the	significance	of	the	variables	included	changed.	Whereas	the	USDJPYt1	and	IProd	variables	remained	significant	at	the	1%	level	of	significance,	the	VIX	became	insignificant.	This	may	imply	that	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	only	fully	materialized	in	the	post-financial	crisis	period.	In	addition,	Japan’s	GDP	growth	is	now	a	significant	variable	influencing	the	Yen	exchange	rate,	which	could	indicate	that	the	
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extreme	economic	downturn	associated	with	the	financial	crisis	distorted	the	explainability	of	the	GDP	variable	and	caused	its	insignificance	in	the	very	first	model.		Both	the	𝑅"	and	𝑅"	remain	at	similar	high	levels	as	compared	to	the	initial	model.		
The	post-Lehman	crisis	period	estimates	shown	in	Table	1	illustrate	that	the	2008	financial	crisis	did	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	USDJPY	exchange	rate.	While	the	coefficient	for	the	VIX	remains	negative	and	underlines	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	the	coefficient	for	Japan’s	demographic	variable	became	negative.	Thus,	a	larger	aging	population	has	now	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	Yen,	which	aligns	with	results	obtained	by	Rose	et	al	(2009),	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006),	and	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009).	This	means	that	in	the	post-Lehman	period,	an	aging	population’s	positive	consumption	effects	outweigh	its	negative	economic	implications,	a	change	that	may	have	been	caused	by	recent	advancements	in	robotic	technology.	In	addition	to	being	integrated	into	the	industrial	sector,	robots	are	now	being	tested	in	the	health	care	sector.	For	instance,	seal-like	robots	are	already	used	in	nursing	homes	to	reduce	anxiety	and	stress	for	patients	suffering	from	dementia.	This	enhances	these	patients’	well	being	as	well	as	decreases	the	need	for	nurses,	which	reduces	health	care	costs	and	labor	demand.	Moreover,	Japan’s	government	has	recently	started	to	incentivize	women	to	join	the	workforce	as	well	as	loosen	regulations	for	foreigners	seeking	work	in	Japan	to	fill	the	labor	shortage	created	by	its	aging	population.	Thus,	Japan’s	most	recent	efforts	to	address	its	workforce	and	health	care	problem	may	explain	the	shift	in	the	population	variable’s	sign	and	imply	that	investors	can	expect	Japan’s	government	budget	to	remain	fairly	sustainable.	This	was	not	mentioned	by	Rose	et	al	(2009),	Andersson	and	Oesterholm	(2006),	and	Aloy	and	Gente	(2009).		
Next,	the	estimates	reveal	that	GDP	has	now	a	positive	effect	on	the	Yen	rate.	
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Each	1-unit	increase	in	the	GDP	growth	rate	leads	to	a	0.011	unit	appreciation	of	the	Yen,	which	aligns	with	economic	theory.	In	contrast	to	the	earlier	argument	stating	that	investors	may	expect	Japan’s	GDP	growth	rate	to	continuously	fluctuate	around	zero,	the	post-Lehman	crisis	model	hints	that	investors’	perception	of	Japan’s	economy	might	have	changed.	Fund	managers	may	now	expect	Japan	to	finally	exit	its	so-called	lost	decade	and	might	even	believe	that	the	BOJ	will	respond	to	higher	economic	growth	by	increasing	its	policy	rate,	which	would	appreciate	the	Yen.	No	such	change	in	expectations	was	discovered	in	the	literature.		
Nonetheless,	the	new	OLS	estimates	for	industrial	production	growth,	another	proxy	for	economic	health,	imply	that	increases	in	its	rate	depreciate	the	Yen,	which	contradicts	the	results	regarding	GDP	growth.	Likewise,	the	OLS	model	shows	that	every	1-unit	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	appreciates	the	Japanese	Yen	by	0.201	units.	This	is	counterintuitive,	since	higher	unemployment	generally	implies	lower	consumption	levels,	more	firms	operating	below	full	capacity,	and	a	reduction	in	tax	revenues.	However,	no	unemployment	is	also	harmful,	a	subject	related	to	the	Phillips	curve.	As	unemployment	decreases,	firms	increase	wages	to	compete	for	a	shrinking	labor	pool.	These	additional	wage	expenses	are	passed	down	to	the	consumer	through	higher	prices,	resulting	in	higher	inflation.	Consequently,	one	could	hypothesize	that	financial	markets	see	rising	unemployment	rates	in	Japan	as	favorable	due	to	the	country’s	very	high	employment	levels	and	its	negative	inflationary	implications.	Nevertheless,	this	explanation	is	not	convincing,	because	Japan	has	been	fighting	deflation	ever	since	the	early	1990’s.		
Another	potential	explanation	for	the	unexpected	signs	of	unemployment	and	industrial	production	could	be	this	paper’s	data	itself,	which	solely	reflects	the	growth	
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rate	for	industrial	production	vis-à-vis	the	pervious	period	and	the	total	percentage	value	for	unemployment.	In	contrast,	Hashimoto	and	Ito	(2014)	and	Christic-David	and	Chaudhry	(2000)	captured	surprises	in	news	releases	by	comparing	the	difference	between	market	expectations	and	actual	data.	Thus,	this	difference	in	data	collection	may	have	caused	these	unexpected	results.		
The	last	significant	change	relative	to	the	previous	models	is	the	BOJ	variable’s	coefficient,	which	changed	from	negative	to	positive.	This	implies	that	higher	BOJ	policy	rates	actually	depreciate	the	underlying	currency,	which	contradicts	economic	theories	and	Kim	and	Kang’s	(2013)	discoveries.	The	only	explanation	is	that	the	financial	crisis	caused	investors	to	expect	that	rate	increases	by	the	BOJ	and	the	associated	rising	borrowing	costs	will	have	such	strong	negative	economic	implications	that	Japan	will	re-experience	its	lost	decade	again.	The	change	in	the	coefficient	of	the	NFAP	was	negligible	and	the	recent	crisis	had	no	real	effect	on	its	economic	implications.		
In	the	post-Lehman	crisis	model,	the	USDJPYt1,	VIX,	and	Oil	variables	became	significant	at	the	1%	level	of	significance,	while	the	p-value	for	Unem	equaled	0.068.	The	VIX’s	significance	suggests	that	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	properties	fully	materialized	in	the	post-financial	crisis	period,	as	theorized	earlier	and	indicated	by	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016).	A	partial	explanation	for	its	significance	may	be	investors’	lack	of	choice	among	potential	safe	haven	assets,	since	Kopyl	and	Lee	(2016)	highlighted	that	only	few	assets	maintained	their	safe	haven	characteristics	in	the	post-Lehman	collapse	period.	Now	that	investors	have	only	two	main	safe	haven	currencies	to	chose	from,	the	USD	and	JPY,	higher	global	volatility	should	appreciate	each	currency	by	relatively	more	compared	to	the	pre-Lehman	period.	This	phenomenon	directly	implies	that	Yen-denominated	assets	now	enable	a	larger	portfolio	variance	decrease	relative	to	the	pre-financial	crisis	
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period.		
Next,	the	oil	variable’s	significance	stresses	the	theory	that	Japanese	firms	manage	rising	energy	prices	more	effectively	relative	to	its	foreign	competitors.	In	addition,	the	significance	of	the	unemployment	variable	underlines	Christic-David	and	Chaudhry	(2000)	and	Hashimoto	and	Ito’s	(2010)	notion	that	macroeconomic	variables	significantly	impact	the	Yen.	However,	two	other	macroeconomic	variables,	IProd	and	GDP,	were	insignificant	in	the	post-Lehman	model.	
The	pre-Lehman	crisis	model	suffers	from	neither	autocorrelation,	as	highlighted	by	the	random	pattern	in	Graph	8	and	Table	9,	nor	multicollinearity,	as	indicated	by	the	low	VIFs	in	Table	4.	So	its	estimates	are	BLUE	and	meet	all	classical	assumptions.	The	post-Lehman	crisis	model	does	not	suffer	from	autocorrelation	either,	as	shown	in	Graph	9	and	Table	9,	but	its	high	variance	inflation	factors	listed	in	Table	5	highlight	that	this	model	suffers	from	imperfect	multicollinearity	and	violates	a	classical	assumption.	This	linear	relationship	among	my	independent	variables	may	impact	my	regression	estimates	and	consequently,	the	results	have	to	be	interpreted	with	caution.		
Overall,	the	different	OLS	estimates	obtained	in	the	three	different	time	periods	provide	more	insight	relative	to	previous	literature	and	show	that	investors	should	be	cautious	when	interpreting	Japanese	macroeconomic	data,	since	some	of	the	Yen’s	movements	associated	with	news	releases	seem	to	contradict	economic	theories.	Moreover,	a	rising	real	BOJ’s	policy	rate	had	an	appreciative	effect	on	the	Yen	in	the	whole	and	pre-Lehman	period	model,	while	it	had	a	depreciative	effect	in	the	post-Lehman	period.	These	contradictory	findings	highlight	that	investors	may	face	numerous	unexpected	challenges	when	investing	in	the	Japanese	market.	
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The	post-Lehman	crisis	regression	estimates,	which	take	into	account	the	most	recent	economic	occurrences,	can	be	used	to	predict	the	future	USDJPY	exchange	rate	and	gain	valuable	insight	regarding	potential	Yen-denominated	investments.	This	additional	step	has	not	been	done	by	literature	yet.	To	obtain	the	future	rates,	the	data	for	the	USDJPYt1,	Oil,	Pop,	and	NFAP	was	estimated	using	the	daily	growth	rate	between	12/31/2008	and	12/31/2014	to	capture	general	trends	in	the	post-Lehman	crisis	period.	As	the	2008	crisis	highly	distorted	funding	liquidity,	the	growth	rate	for	the	TED	spread	was	computed	for	the	less	volatile	period	12/31/2009	–	12/31/2014.	Lastly,	GDP	growth	forecasts	were	collected	from	knomea.com	and	the	2014	pattern	of	the	VIX	was	used	as	a	proxy	for	its	future	movements,	as	this	specific	year	did	not	experience	extreme	stock	market	volatility.		
The	predicted	USDJPY	rate	until	2030	is	shown	in	Graph	10	and	illustrates	that	the	Yen	will	continuously	depreciate	from	an	initial	value	of	119.63	Yen	per	Dollar	in	2014	to	238.21	Yen	per	Dollar	by	2030,	thus	losing	almost	half	of	its	value	over	the	next	16	years.	This	equals	an	annual	return	of	-4.4%.	The	implication	for	investment	managers	is	that	returns	on	Yen-denominated	assets	have	to	be	at	least	4.4%	annually	to	solely	offset	the	unfavorable	exchange	rate	developments	and	make	investments	in	Japan	worthwhile.	However,	investors	can	justify	investments	in	Yen-denominated	assets	that	do	not	meet	this	specific	hurdle	rate	if	the	main	purpose	of	the	investment	is	to	benefit	from	the	Yen’s	safe	have	characteristics	and	minimize	portfolio	variance	during	risk-off	periods.	This	protection	will	be	especially	valuable	for	more	conservative	investors.	In	addition,	hedge	funds	expecting	market	declines	could	benefit	from	the	Yen’s	characteristic	by	taking	short	positions	in	perceived	overvalued	assets	and	taking	long	positions	in	Yen-denominated	assets.	
	 44	
Lastly,	the	USDJPY	forecast	highlights	a	trade-off	Japanese	investors	face.	Since	Japanese	investors	mainly	hold	domestic	assets	due	to	their	strong	home	bias,	this	paper’s	USDJPY	forecast	until	2030	implies	that	most	Japanese	investors	will	face	an	annual	return	of	-4.4%	on	their	portfolios	solely	due	to	an	ongoing	value-decline	in	the	Yen,	as	stated	earlier.	Thus,	a	¥10,000	investment	today	will	shrink	to	¥4,868	by	2030	if	the	underlying	asset	does	not	change	in	value.	This	suggests	that	Japanese	investors	should	seek	investments	abroad	to	avoid	such	unfavorable	exchange	rate	developments.	However,	Japanese	investors	who	only	invest	abroad	will	forego	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	properties	and	suffer	large	declines	in	portfolio	values	in	face	of	potential	crisis,	while	the	typical	Japanese	investor	who	exclusively	invests	in	Japan	will	witness	a	Yen	appreciation	and	hence	a	value	increase	in	his	portfolio.	Consequently,	Japanese	investors	will	have	to	decide	whether	to	obtain	higher	returns	in	a	more	risky	foreign	environment	or	to	take	advantage	of	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	at	the	cost	of	low	or	even	negative	returns.	Allowing	for	a	more	balanced	asset	allocation	between	domestic	and	foreign	assets	can,	of	course,	eases	this	dilemma.		
V.	Conclusion	This	paper’s	results	highlight	that	the	most	significant	factors	explaining	the	Yen’s	behavior	are	its	safe	haven	status	and	yesterday’s	Yen	rate.	The	most	recent	appreciation	of	the	Yen	in	early	January	of	2016	despite	the	introduction	of	negative	interest	rates	on	reserve	deposits	was	probably	caused	by	uncertainty	regarding	the	Chinese	economy,	which	made	investors	panic	and	increased	demand	for	safe	haven	assets.	Similarly,	the	Yen	appreciated	right	after	Donald	Trump’s	nomination	as	the	next	U.S.	president,	illustrated	by	the	sudden	drop	on	November	9th	in	Graph	11.	Both	events	
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underline	the	Yen’s	role	as	a	safe	haven	currency	and	its	usefulness	in	minimizing	portfolio	variance	during	risk-off	periods.	The	Yen’s	safe	haven	status	implies	that	many	investors	hold	Yen-denominated	assets	for	only	a	short	time	period	until	markets	return	to	equilibrium.	Investors	in	the	Japanese	market	should	therefore	note	that	gains	witnessed	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	crisis	outbreaks	will	straightaway	erode	once	the	global	economy	returns	to	equilibrium	and	risk-aversion	decreases.	Thus,	short-term	oriented	Yen-traders	should	time	their	exit	well	to	secure	gains.		Additional	lessons	for	investors	are	that	first,	the	existence	of	the	momentum	effect	implies	that	technical	analysis	might	be	a	profitable	investment	strategy	in	the	case	of	the	Japanese	Yen.	Second,	two	decades	of	low	interest	rates	indicate	that	speculators	were	able	to	and	still	can	borrow	money	easily	and	cheaply.	As	yields	on	safe	Japanese	assets	are	low,	these	speculators	search	for	higher-yielding,	more	risky	assets	to	meet	their	expected	returns.	This	risky	behavior	could	endanger	financial	markets	and	facilitate	another	asset	price	bubbles.	Therefore,	managers	invested	in	Japan	must	be	very	careful,	as	securities	may	be	highly	overvalued.	It	will,	however,	be	highly	interesting	to	see	the	effects	of	another	Japanese	asset	price	bubble	in	Japan.	Due	to	the	interconnectedness	of	the	global	economy,	a	crisis	in	Japan	will	increase	worldwide	risk	aversion,	which	should	appreciate	the	Yen.	Japan’s	vicious	cycle	would	start	all-over	again.		Overall,	this	paper’s	conclusion	should	be	carefully	evaluated.	For	instance,	classifying	Japan	as	a	safe	haven	might	be	inaccurate,	as	a	study	by	Hossfeld	and	MacDonald	(2014)	rejected	this	notion.	According	to	the	authors,	the	Yen’s	ongoing	appreciation	is	caused	by	carry	trade,	meaning	that	the	Yen	neither	qualifies	as	a	safe	haven	currency	nor	as	a	hedge	currency.	Similarly,	Ono	(2000)	blamed	the	decrease	in	
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Japanese	household	consumption	after	the	bubble	to	have	cause	the	strong	Yen	appreciation.	While	Gagnon	and	Chabond	(2007)	did	not	reject	the	Yen’s	safe	haven	status,	the	authors	proposed	that	a	strong	correlation	between	the	Yen	and	Yen	carry	trade	may	exist.	Finally,	Botman	et	al	(2013)	suggested	that	the	abnormal	Yen-appreciation	had	not	been	caused	by	capital	inflows,	but	rather	by	derivatives	trading	that	directly	affected	spot	exchange	rates.	Consequently,	further	research	must	be	done	to	fully	understand	and	identify	all	factors	influencing	the	Japanese	Yen.											 	
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VI.	List	of	Tables:					
Table	1	Table	of	Results		 Whole	Time	Period	 Pre-Lehman	Crisis	 Post-Lehman	Crisis	
USDJPYt1 	 0.998***	(0.0009)	 0.997***	(0.001)	 0.99***	(0.003)	
VIX 	 -0.005***	(0.002)	 -0.003	(0.003)	 -0.021***	(0.004)	
Oil 	 -0.0004	(0.0005)	 -0.0006	(0.0007)	 -0.009***	(0.002)	
TED 	 -0.013	(0.033)	 0.008	(0.05)	 0.077	(0.084)	
Pop 	 0.0001	(0.0006)	 0.0007	(0.0007)	 -0.092	(0.081)	
GDP 	 0.001	(0.005)	 0.027***	(0.01)	 -0.011	(0.007)	
NFAP 	 -3.15e-16	(6.8e-16)	 -4.17e-16	(7.8e-16)	 4.9e-15	(5.24e-15)	
Unem 	 0.011	(0.013)	 0.015	(0.017)	 -0.201*	(0.11)	
I Prod 	 -0.008**	(0.003)	 -0.03***	(0.009)	 0.0003	(0.004)	
realBOJ 	 -0.012	(0.013)	 -0.023	(0.018)	 0.002	(0.037)	Constant	 0.294**	(0.127)	 0.344**	(0.154)	 4.833**	(2.082)	
R2 	 99.79%	 99.62%	 99.54%	
R2 	 99.78%	 99.62%	 99.53%	N	 6,522	 4,880	 1,642	All	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses	*	indicates	significance	at	10%	level	of	significance	**	indicates	significance	at	5%	level	of	significance	***	indicates	significance	at	1%	level	of	significance		
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Table	2	Summary	of	Variables	
USDJPY 	 Exchange	Rates	United	States	Dollar	Japan	Yen	
USDJPYt1 	 Lagged	USDJPY	variable,	by	1	day	
VIX 	 CBOE	Volatility	Index®,	S&P500	
Oil 	 Crude	Oil	Price	Futures	(Light	Sweet	Crude)	USA		-	Price			-	$/barrel	
TED 	 TED	Spread,	Percent,	Daily	Not	Seasonally	Adjusted	
Pop 	 Japan	-	Population	ages	65	and	above	(%	of	total)			
GDP 	 Japan	GDP	growth	rate	(annual	%)	
NFAP 	 Net	foreign	asset	position	(current	LCU)	
Unem 	 Unemployment	Rate:	Aged	15-64:	All	Persons	for	Japan©,	Percent,	Monthly,	Seasonally	Adjusted	
I Prod 	 Total	Industry	Production	Excluding	Construction	for	Japan©,	Growth	Rate	Previous	Period,	Quarterly,	Seasonally	Adjusted	
realBOJ 	 The	real	Basic	Discount	Rate	and	Basic	Loan	Rate			
	
Table	3	VIF:	Whole	Time	Period		 Whole	Time	Period	Variable	 VIF	
NFAP 	 5.81	
Oil 	 2.71	
USDJPYt1 	 2.23	
VIX 	 2.19	
Unem 	 2.16	
realBOJ 	 2.03	
TED 	 1.75	
Pop 	 1.45	
GDP 	 1.29	
I Prod 	 1.20	Mean	VIF	 2.28		
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Table	4	VIF:	Pre-Lehman	Crisis		 Pre-Lehman	Crisis	Variable	 VIF	
NFAP 	 4.21	
Unem 	 2.74	
VIX 	 2.38	
realBOJ 	 2.37	
Oil 	 2.06	
TED 	 1.98	
Pop 	 1.96	
GDP 	 1.92	
USDJPYt1 	 1.76	
I Prod 	 1.57	Mean	VIF	 2.30			
Table	5	VIF:	Post-Lehman	Crisis		 Post-Lehman	Crisis	Variable	 VIF	
Pop 	 36.28	
NFAP 	 19.22	
Unem 	 14.52	
realBOJ 	 7.68	
TED 	 6.83	
VIX 	 6.60	
Oil 	 4.11	
USDJPYt1 	 3.22	
I Prod 	 1.74	
GDP 	 1.67	Mean	VIF	 10.19			
Table	6	Summary	Statistic:	Whole	Time	Period	Variable	 Observation	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min.	 Max	
USDJPY 	 11,899	 161.038	 73.17	 75.72	 358.44	
USDJPYt1 	 11,899	 161.038	 73.17	 75.72	 358.44	
VIX 	 7,046	 19.659	 7.83	 9.31	 80.86	
Oil 	 8,837	 41.892	 29.138	 10.42	 145.29	
TED 	 8,138	 0.589	 0.441	 0.09	 4.58	
Pop 	 11,583	 16.984	 16.449	 7.2	 118.2	
GDP 	 11,844	 2.46	 2.68	 -5.523	 8.414	
NFAP 	 11,900	 3.03e+13	 4.18e+13	 -3.05e+13	 1.21e+14	
Unem 	 11,364	 3.3	 1.3	 1.1	 5.8	
I Prod 	 11,322	 0.45	 2.675	 -19.64	 7.05	
realBOJ 	 9,341	 0.997	 1.297	 -2.449	 3.897	
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Table	7	Summary	Statistic:	Pre-Lehman	Crisis	Variable	 Observation	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min.	 Max	
USDJPY 	 9,680	 175.67	 73.401	 81.12	 358.44	
USDJPYt1 	 9,679	 175.67	 73.401	 81.12	 358.44	
VIX 	 4,880	 19.122	 6.342	 9.31	 45.74	
Oil 	 6,621	 30.55	 21.14	 10.42	 145.29	
TED 	 5,923	 0.664	 0.41	 0.1	 3.02	
Pop 	 9,680	 15.57	 17.64	 7.2	 118.2	
GDP 	 9,680	 2.944	 2.439	 -2.003	 8.414	
NFAP 	 9,680	 1.57e+13	 3.04e+13	 -3.05e+13	 9.79e+13	
Unem 	 9,680	 3.065	 1.244	 1.1	 5.8	
I Prod 	 9,680	 0.579	 1.874	 -6.618	 6.002	
realBOJ 	 7,438	 1.241	 1.203	 -1.562	 3.897		
	
Table	8	Summary	Statistic:	Post-Lehman	Crisis	Variable	 Observation	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min.	 Max	
USDJPY 	 2,219	 97.21	 14.069	 75.72	 125.58	
USDJPYt1 	 2,220	 97.21	 14.069	 75.72	 125.58	
VIX 	 2,166	 20.867	 10.332	 10.32	 80.86	
Oil 	 2,216	 75.781	 22.754	 26.21	 120.92	
TED 	 2,215	 0.389	 0.461	 0.09	 4.58	
Pop 	 1,903	 24.177	 1.451	 21.6	 26.3	
GDP 	 2,164	 0.297	 2.643	 -5.527	 4.711	
NFAP 	 2,220	 9.36e+13	 2.05e+13	 6.39e+13	 1.21e+14	
Unem 	 1,684	 4.62	 0.604	 3.6	 5.7	
I Prod 	 1,642	 -0.31	 5.291	 -19.639	 7.052	
realBOJ 	 1,903	 0.044	 1.21	 -2.449	 1.647			
Table	9	Durbin-Watson	Test:	Hypothesis	and	Results	Durbin-Watson	Test,	Hypothesis	 	H(0):	no	positive	autocorrelation	 p≤0		H(A):	positive	autocorrelation	 P>0	Reject	H(0)/have	pos.	AC	if	 d<1.12	Fail	to	reject	H(0)/no	pos.	AC	if	 d>1.66	Inconclusive	 1.12<d<1.66	
		 Whole	time	period	 Pre-Lehman	crisis	 Post-Lehman	crisis	Durbin-Watson	d-statistic	 2.023207	 1.982178	 2.191436	
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VII.	List	of	Graphs:	
	
	
	
Graph	1	Japan	GDP	Growth	Rate	
					
Graph	2	USDJPY	Exchange	Rate	
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Graph	3	USDJPY	Exchange	Rate,	Post-Lehman	Crisis	
						
Graph	4	Japan	Change	in	M2	Money	Supply	
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Graph	5	US	Change	in	M2	Money	Supply	
	
	
	
	
Graph	6	Historical	VIX	Movement	
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Graph	7	Autocorrelation,	Whole	Time	Period	
	
	
Graph	8	Autocorrelation,	Pre-Lehman	Period	
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Graph	9	Autocorrelation,	Post-Lehman	Period	
					
Graph	10	Predicted	USDJPY	Exchange	Rate	
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Graph	11	USDJPY	Exchange	Rate	
		
	
	
	
Graph	12	Japan	Net	Foreign	Asset	Position	
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